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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
JUDGING PSYCHOLOGY EXPERTS: CAN JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS 
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGISTS? 
by 
Shari Schwartz 
Florida International University, 2012 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Nadja Schreiber Compo, Major Professor 
A trial judge serves as gatekeeper in the courtroom to ensure that only reliable 
expert witness testimony is presented to the jury. Nevertheless, research shows that while 
judges take seriously their gatekeeper status, legal professionals in general are unable to 
identify well conducted research and are unable to define falsifiability, error rates, peer 
review status, and scientific validity (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). 
However, the abilities to identify quality scientific research and define scientific concepts 
are critical to preventing “junk” science from entering courtrooms. Research thus far has 
neglected to address that before selecting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys must 
first evaluate experts’ CVs rather than their scientific testimony to determine whether 
legal standards of admissibility have been met. The quality of expert testimony, therefore, 
largely depends on the ability to evaluate properly experts’ credentials.  Theoretical 
models of decision making suggest that ability/knowledge and motivation are required to 
process information systematically. Legal professionals (judges and attorneys) were 
expected to process CVs heuristically when rendering expert witness decisions due to a 
lack of training in areas of psychology expertise. 
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Legal professionals’ (N = 150) and undergraduate students’ (N = 468) expert 
witness decisions were examined and compared. Participants were presented with one of 
two versions of a criminal case calling for the testimony of either a clinical psychology 
expert or an experimental legal psychology expert. Participants then read one of eight 
curricula vitae that varied area of expertise (clinical vs. legal psychology), previous 
expert witness experience (previous experience vs. no previous experience), and 
scholarly publication record (30 publications vs. no publications) before deciding 
whether the expert was qualified to testify in the case. Follow-up measures assessed 
participants’ decision making processes. 
Legal professionals were not better than college students at rendering quality 
psychology expert witness admissibility decisions yet they were significantly more 
confident in their decisions. Legal professionals rated themselves significantly higher 
than students in ability, knowledge, and motivation to choose an appropriate psychology 
expert although their expert witness decisions were equally inadequate.  Findings suggest 
that participants relied on heuristics, such as previous expert witness experience, to 
render decisions.  
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Chapter I 
Literature Review 
 The veracity of expert witness testimony and the role experts should have in court 
proceedings have been the subject of debate for centuries. Expert witnesses have been 
criticized for taking on the role of an advocate for one side or the other depending on who 
has hired them (Anderten, Stalcup, & Grisso, 1980; Foster, 1897; Otto, 1989; Schetky & 
Colbach, 1982). For example, when hired by defense counsel in a criminal matter, it may 
become the mission of the expert to present scientific testimony that supports the 
defendant’s acquittal and vice versa (Anderten, Stalcup, and Grisso, 1980; Foster, 1897; 
Schetky & Colbach, 1982). Research shows that the existence of dueling psychology 
experts has lead to monikers such as “hired guns,” (Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000; Gutheil & 
Appelbaum, 1982; Homant & Kennedy, 1987; McCloskey & Egeth, 1983; Otto, 1989; 
Swenson, Nash, & Roos, 1984) and “whores of the court” (Hagan, 1997).  However, it 
may be the case that biased expert testimony is unintentional (Otto, 1989). The expert 
may believe that s/he has drawn unbiased conclusions on the basis of incontrovertible 
scientific evidence. Moreover, the expert may believe that because s/he has been hired by 
an attorney and appointed by the judge, s/he must actually be an expert in the area of 
testimony.  Thus, it appears that the quality of expert witness testimony may depend on 
attorneys’ and judges’ decisions as to whether an expert witness is qualified to provide 
testimony in a given area or subject matter.   
One of the trial judge’s primary responsibilities is to serve as gatekeeper in the 
courtroom to ensure that a defendant’s constitutional rights are protected during the legal 
process. A key role of the judge-as-gatekeeper is to render expert witness testimony 
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admissibility decisions (Cutler & Kovera, 2011; Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & 
McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff, 2009; Vidmar, 2011).  Judges’ initial expert witness 
admissibility decisions are derived from experts’ curricula vitae that are submitted by 
attorneys who have retained the experts.  The inability of judges and attorneys to identify 
whether a psychologist, for example, possesses the requisite expertise in a given area of 
specialty could lead to allowing the psychologist to provide expert witness testimony in 
an area in which s/he is not truly an authority.  Importantly, allowing pseudo-experts to 
testify on subject matter in which they lack authentic expertise is an egregious violation 
of legal standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States as the standards are 
in place to prevent junk science in U.S. courtrooms. If the judge allows the jury to hear a 
pseudo psychology expert testify, jurors may assume that the psychologist is a specialist 
in the subject area simply because the judge has allowed the testimony to be presented 
(Schweitzer & Saks, 2009). This, in turn, could influence verdict decisions and may have 
negative implications for the American justice system. 
In the United States, judges’ expert witness admissibility decisions are governed 
by the legal requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony. There are two distinct 
legal approaches for judges to use, depending on jurisdiction, when assessing the 
admissibility of expert witness testimony:  the Frye standard (Frye v. United States, 
1923) and the Daubert standard (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993). 
Although judges in most states use the Daubert standard to guide expert witness 
testimony admissibility decisions, it is important to note that some states, such as Florida, 
continue to use the Frye standard.  
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The Frye Standard  
In Frye v. United States, (1923), the issue of expert testimony admissibility arose 
when counsel for second degree murder defendant, James Frye, introduced expert 
testimony on the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test administered by 
psychologist, William Marston.  Frye asserted that passing the test was proof of his 
innocence, however, the court denied the motion reasoning that the test and the science 
behind it were not “generally accepted” as reliable by the relevant scientific community. 
According to the Frye decision, in order to determine whether a particular scientific test 
and its results are generally accepted thus admissible, the findings and conclusions must 
be generally accepted within its scientific community.  
Although there appears to be some jurisdictional variation in what has since been 
called the Frye test/standard, in principle the Frye test consists of a four-prong 
examination when vetting experts. They are: 1) whether the witness is competent in the 
field of expertise that s/he aims to address at trial, specifically whether the expert witness 
possesses the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge, and/or experience from 
which it can be assumed that the expert’s professional opinion or imparted information is 
reliable; 2) that the expert’s testimony is based on a scientific principle or procedure 
which is established and has achieved general acceptance among scientists in the relevant 
scientific community; 3) that the expert’s testimony be useful in assisting the jury to 
better understand the evidence in the case; and 4) that the expert’s opinions must be case-
specific and relevant to the case before the court (Frye v. United States, 1923). 
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The Daubert Standard 
 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), the plaintiffs (Jason Daubert 
and Eric Schuller) sued the defendant (Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals) for damages 
related to birth defects. The plaintiffs alleged that their birth defects were caused by 
medication manufactured by the defendant. The drug was taken by the plaintiffs’ mothers 
while each was pregnant. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals moved to have the case heard in 
federal court because their expert witness submitted documents showing that no 
published scientific study demonstrated a link between the drug and birth defects. The 
defendant, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, moved for summary judgment of the case and 
the court granted their motion (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993). 
Eventually, the case made its way to the Supreme Court of the United States and 
the outcome resulted in a new four-prong standard of admissibility for expert testimony: 
1) that the judge is the gatekeeper in the courtroom and s/he must determine ultimately 
whether scientific testimony is admissible; 2) the judge should rule as to the relevance 
and reliability of the proffered scientific testimony (that is, the judge must find it more 
likely than not that the expert's methods are reliable and are applied reliably to the facts 
of the case); 3) the scientific evidence must be generally accepted by the relevant 
scientific community such that it must be accompanied by a known error rate, subjected 
to the rigors of peer review thus published; and 4) that the theory or technique is testable, 
falsifiable, and refutable (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993).  
It is important to point out that there appears to be a critical difference between 
Frye and Daubert such that the latter does not explicitly state that it takes into 
consideration the expert’s credentials; the four prongs refer only to the testimony the 
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expert is to provide. However, the first prong in Frye refers directly to the proffered 
expert’s skill, training, education, knowledge, and experience in order to conclude that 
s/he is qualified to provide reliable expert witness testimony. It stands to reason that in 
order to be an effective gatekeeper of expert witness testimony judges must take into 
consideration the expert’s qualifications to provide testimony in a given area. 
When applied to the context of psychology expert testimony, the legal standards 
that guide judges’ expert witness admissibility decisions emphasize that the psychologist 
should be competent/trained  in his/her field of expertise and that his/her testimony 
should be on information that is accepted by his/her scientific community. One important 
fact neglected by past research, and arguably mismatched between Frye/Daubert and its 
real-world application, is that judges are rarely exposed to scientific testimony of the 
potential expert before rendering admissibility decisions. Rather, judges base their initial 
admissibility decisions solely on potential expert witnesses’ CVs prior to hearing experts’ 
testimony. Similarly, attorneys often infer whether a potential expert is suitable for their 
case from the expert witness’s CV. As such, legal professionals are presented with the 
difficult challenge of inferring from those CVs whether legal standards of expert witness 
admissibility are met.  
There is evidence that judges do not always fulfill successfully their gatekeeper-
role in keeping pseudo psychology experts out of the courtroom. Rowe (1992) recounted 
an example of a “psychologist” who was retained as an expert witness in numerous 
Michigan homicide cases. The expert’s role was to testify to various defendants’ future 
dangerousness. Eventually, an opposing defense attorney conducted an investigation into 
the “psychologist’s” expertise and found that the expert had earned a doctorate in music 
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rather than psychology.  Although it is a dramatic example, Rowe asserts that pseudo 
psychology experts are retained and accepted as expert witnesses fairly frequently. As 
such, it seems clear that judges and attorneys may require assistance in identifying 
suitable psychology expert witnesses. An expert trained in an area other than that in 
which s/he is appointed to provide testimony cannot possibly meet the criteria set forth in 
Frye and/or Daubert.  In order to help judges maximize appropriate judicial gatekeeping 
regarding psychology experts, the process by which judges and attorneys determine 
whether a psychologist is an appropriate expert in a given area of specialty must first be 
examined.  
Vidmar (2011) points out that the body of empirical research on judicial decision 
making is incredibly small despite the crucial role judges play in meting out justice. 
Schauer (2010) suggests that research should address whether, with regard to specific 
legal tasks such as hiring and admitting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys differ from 
laypeople in task performance and decision making. The author criticizes that much 
empirical research on legal decision making is conducted on laypersons that do not have 
experience rendering critical legal decisions. Consequently, it is difficult to generalize the 
findings to judges and attorneys. According to Schauer (2010), without comparing the 
performance of legal professionals to laypersons it is virtually impossible to determine 
the most influential factors in legal professionals’ versus laypersons’ decisions. It may be 
that attending law school, then practicing law, and then presiding over trials affects 
specific and critical legal decisions, such as choosing and admitting expert witnesses, in a 
divergent manner (Schauer, 2010) compared to laypersons without legal training and 
experience.  
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Empirical Research on Judicial Decision Making 
Kovera and McAuliff (2000) examined whether judges were able to distinguish 
between good and bad scientific psychological evidence, and whether this ability differed 
depending on whether judges had previous scientific training. In their study, a sample of 
judges read a description of an expert witness’s study on gender and stereotyping to be 
presented in a mock sexual harassment trial. Judges were then asked to render an 
admissibility decision. The researchers manipulated the peer review status and internal 
validity of the study on which their stimulus expert witness testimony was based. In a 
post hoc questionnaire, some judges in the sample reported that they had received prior 
scientific and/or statistics training. Findings supported their hypothesis that judges with 
scientific training were better able to distinguish between good and bad science than 
judges who had no prior scientific training. However, only 17% of the total sample rated 
the expert’s testimony as admissible regardless of the quality of the science. The 
researchers concluded that rather than poorly conducted research being admitted, high 
quality psychological science testimony is likely excluded in many cases (Kovera & 
McAuliff, 2000).  
Gatkowski et al. (2001) surveyed 400 state court judges from across the United 
States to ascertain judges’ opinions of the utility of the Daubert criteria and whether these 
enhanced judges’ admissibility decisions. Results showed that regardless of the 
admissibility standard followed in the judge’s jurisdiction (Frye or Daubert), judges were 
in support of their gatekeeper status as defined in Daubert. However, many judges lacked 
the ability to define properly falsifiability and error rates, and assigned great weight to the 
idea of general acceptance as a criterion for admissibility. The researchers noted that 
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judges took their role as gatekeepers very seriously indicating that judges placed a high 
level of importance on rendering sound decisions in the interest of administering justice 
fairly and equitably. Nevertheless, if judges are not clear on the concepts of falsifiability, 
error rates, peer review status, and scientific validity (Kovera & McAuliff, 2000), then 
sound admissibility decisions made on the basis of the quality of the science are 
jeopardized. Gatkowski and colleagues concluded that in order for judges to make 
optimal admissibility decisions, they must have the ability to assess accurately the 
information presented to them.  
Faigman and Monahan (2009) point out an additional hurdle to judges being 
adequate gatekeepers in preventing junk psychological science in the courtroom. 
Specifically, the authors noted that the courts face a challenge in matching a psychology 
expert’s qualifications, in terms of experience, with the substantive nature of his/her 
testimony. Differences in state requirements in terms of licensing, certification, training, 
and precisely what constitutes expertise in a given area make it especially challenging for 
the court to determine whether a psychology expert is qualified to provide testimony in a 
given area. Furthermore, a variety of psychology graduate degrees make it even more 
difficult for a non-psychologist to ascertain whether an expert is qualified to testify in a 
given area of psychology. Therefore, scholars have suggested that courts may rely on 
previous expert witness experience to determine whether or not to allow a psychology 
expert to testify (Faigman & Monahan, 2009), regardless of what type of testimony the 
expert provided in previous cases.  This suggests that judges may rely firmly on criteria 
such as prior experience as an expert witness, which appear to be outside of criteria set 
forth in Frye and Daubert. Importantly, Faigman and Monahan’s arguments imply that 
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many judges base their admissibility decisions on their assessment of experts’ prior 
experience testifying rather than their actual scientific and professional credentials. This 
is an important consideration for the proposed study.   
Empirical Research on Mock Jurors’ Expert Witness Perceptions 
Empirical research on the influence of expert witnesses’ credentials on mock-
jurors’ decisions is more readily available than research on judges’ and attorneys’ expert 
witness perceptions. For example, Cooper, Bennett, and Sukel (1996) examined the 
effects of complex scientific testimony and the expert’s credentials on mock jurors’ 
perceptions. Expert credentials were varied based on prestige of the university from 
which each expert obtained their degrees, the prestige of the university where each was 
employed, the number of publications in their areas of expertise, and whether they had 
served as a scientific journal editor.  Both of the proffered experts worked in academic 
settings. Factors such as university prestige, publication rate, and serving as a scholarly 
journal editor were believed to be cues to expertise conducive to the use heuristics in 
processing the information.  Linguistic complexity of the testimony was manipulated to 
elicit systematic processing. Importantly, the authors manipulated expert witness 
qualifications in the form of experts’ credentials as opposed to the science experts were 
testifying about.  
A sample of community members serving as mock jurors watched one of four 
videotapes of the expert’s testimony that varied in level of testimony complexity and the 
expert’s credentials.  When testimony was highly linguistically complex, participants 
placed greater weight on the expert’s credentials in rendering verdict decisions than when 
the testimony was less linguistically complex. The authors found that when the testimony 
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was difficult to understand participants relied on peripheral cues to witness credibility, 
such as the expert’s academic and professional experience, to render a verdict. When the 
testimony was less complex, participants made their decisions based on the expert’s 
testimony (central cue; systematic processing) rather than his credentials. Similar to 
Kovera and McAuliff (2000), Cooper et al. concluded that their findings could be 
explained by the theoretical models of information processing put forth by Chaiken 
(1980; Heuristic-Systematic Model) and Petty and Cacioppo (1986a; Elaboration 
Likelihood Model).  
Although no study to date has directly compared judges’ and layperson’s 
decision-making regarding expert witness testimony in the court room, the few studies 
described suggest that judges may not be better than laypersons at discriminating between  
poorly conducted and well conducted scientific research (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera 
& McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008). These findings are troubling given that 
judges’ inability to distinguish between good and bad research are typically part of high-
stakes legal decisions. Moreover, these findings suggest that judges may be unable to 
distinguish between qualified experts and pseudo experts given their inability to identify 
poorly conducted research. 
Theoretical Models Used to Explain Judicial Decision Making 
Although Kovera and McAuliff (2000) did not test directly formal psychological 
theories of decision making, they suggested that judicial reasoning may be best explained 
by formal models of information processing such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, 
1980). That is, judges’ admissibility decisions with regard to psychological science 
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testimony may be moderated both by their motivation to scrutinize the testimony and 
their ability to analyze systematically such evidence (Kovera & McAuliff, 2000).  
Similar to Kovera and McAuliff (2000), other researchers who have investigated 
how laypersons make decisions regarding the veracity of expert witness testimony posit 
that two major information processing theories can help explain their findings (Cooper, 
Bennett, & Sukel 1996; Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000; Cutler & Kovera, 2011). They are the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a) and the Heuristic-
Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980). Each explains information processing along an 
elaboration continuum that ranges from implicit, unconscious, automatic processes to 
conscious, explicit, controlled processes (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). For example, 
automatic processing may be inferred if little cognitive effort is expended to process any 
provided information. Controlled processing may be inferred when individuals exert 
considerable cognitive effort to arrive at a decision. The factors that determine which 
type of processing individuals are likely to engage include, but are not limited to, 
motivation, ability, and the particular situation (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986a; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Petty, Wheeler, & Tormala, 2003). Because 
the two models are relatively similar and make similar predictions both are discussed in 
the next section.  
Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. In a well-known dual-process 
model of persuasion, the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), Petty and Cacioppo 
(1986a) describe the two processes as the central and the peripheral route to persuasion. 
The central route to persuasion requires systematic, effortful cognitive processing 
whereas the peripheral route typically entails automatic, intuitive information processing. 
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The model has traditionally been applied to contexts such as advertising and politics such 
that an advertiser’s ability to persuade consumers to purchase a service or product will 
have a direct impact on generated sales revenue. However, it can also be applied to a 
multitude of social judgment and inference contexts such as determining whether a 
psychologist is an expert on a particular social science topic. According to researchers, 
whether a person engages in intuitive versus effortful processing of a persuasive message 
depends on his/her motivation, how personally relevant the message is to him/her, and 
his/her ability to engage in effortful processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986b; Petty, Wheeler, & Tormala, 2003).   
The researchers postulate that the two most influential factors in determining 
which route of information processing an individual will take are whether the individual 
is capable of judicious evaluation of the message (ability; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976), 
and whether s/he has the desire to process the message (motivation; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1979).  Someone who engages in central route processing is more likely to have a high 
need for cognition (i.e., they enjoy thinking about and reflecting deeply on issues; 
Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), and is less likely to be persuaded by peripheral cues such as the 
attractiveness of an expert (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990). 
Moreover, s/he is likely to scrutinize the information closely and, in the case of a judge’s 
admissibility decision, will examine the expert’s key qualifications.  
On the other hand, an individual who is either unwilling or unable to process 
information on a deeper level is most likely someone with a low need for cognition 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  This individual is easily persuaded by qualities such as the 
attractiveness of the expert and the perceived appeal of the expert’s message (Petty & 
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Cacioppo, 1986a). Low need-for-cognition individuals may possess the ability to engage 
in central processing but will do so only if there is some personal motivation involved. 
Likewise, high need-for-cognition individuals do not always process information 
centrally. They may use peripheral cues when the message is not highly important or 
relevant to them. This may be due to a lack the motivation to use valuable cognitive 
resources or a lack of ability to evaluate the information centrally.  
Heuristic-Systematic Model of information processing. Similar to the ELM 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; Petty and Cacioppo 1986b), the Heuristic-Systematic Model 
(HSM; Chaiken, 1980) is a dual-process theory that explains how individuals process 
information.  The main difference between the HSM and the ELM is that the ELM posits 
that there is an inverse relationship between central and peripheral route processing. For 
example, as one type of processing increases, the other type decreases. However, 
according to the HSM, the two types of processing can occur independently or 
simultaneously.  
One end of the HSM entails analytical, comprehensive processes that are referred 
to as systematic processing. The other entails automatic, intuitive processes referred to as 
heuristic processing. Individuals who engage in systematic processing will take into 
account detailed source characteristics (i.e., reliability of the source), and the content of 
the message to make a decision while exerting considerable cognitive effort (Chaiken, 
1980). Heuristic processing places little emphasis on detailed information processing and 
instead facilitates decision-making by using mental shortcuts based on availability and 
representativeness while exerting little cognitive effort (Chaiken, 1980; Tversky & 
Kahnemann, 1974).  Research shows that individuals rely on heuristics to make decisions 
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when the issue under consideration is insignificant or irrelevant to the decision-maker 
(Chaiken, 1980; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), or when the decision-maker faces a time 
constraint that does not allow for systematic processing (Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991). 
According to Chaiken (1980), decision-makers relying on heuristics may accept 
information that they may otherwise have correctly rejected had they engaged in more 
effortful systematic processing. 
 Arguably, judges and attorneys are likely to score high on Cacioppo and Petty’s 
(1982) Need for Cognition Scale and are, therefore, likely to enjoy engaging in 
deliberate, effortful processing of information. However, research suggests that judges 
must not be only be motivated to examine the information carefully (e.g., Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994; Petty et al., 1981), but also have the ability to adequately process the 
information to engage in systematic processing (Ratneshwar & Chiaken, 1991).  Based 
on the Gatkowski et al. (2001) findings that judges lack the ability to define properly 
falsifiability and error rates, and Kovera and McAuliff’s (2000) finding that judges keep 
good science out of the courtroom, it appears judges lack at least one of the two criteria 
necessary for the central route to information processing: the ability to evaluate properly 
psychology expert witnesses’ credentials.  Specifically, judges who lack the knowledge 
thus ability to properly evaluate expert witness credentials (e.g., publication record, area 
of expertise) may unduly base their decisions on peripheral, heuristic cues (e.g., expert’s 
prior experience testifying). The current study, therefore, examined the relative 
importance of central cues (expert’s area of training and publication record) and a 
peripheral cue (expert’s prior testimony record) on judges’ expert witness admissibility 
decisions.   
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Judges’ Professional Expertise  
It should be noted that legal professionals may not be in a position to evaluate 
properly psychology experts’ credentials because they lack psychology 
training/knowledge. According to Kahneman and Klein (2009), almost all professionals, 
regardless of domain, are called upon to perform tasks that they have not mastered 
perhaps due to a lack of exposure to the task or a lack of specialized training in that task. 
Thus professionals possess what the researchers refer to as “fractionated” expertise. That 
is, professionals may apply their knowledge and skills to certain aspects of their jobs with 
great success, however, when they attempt to apply the same knowledge and skills in the 
exact same way to other aspects of their jobs, the results can be suboptimal.  Kahneman 
and Klein (2009) believe that fractionated expertise typifies the essence of expertise 
rather than signifying an exception to the rule of expertise. One problem of fractionated 
expertise is that it may lead to overconfidence in decision-making on issues for which 
professionals have little or no skill (Kahneman & Klein, 2009) as may be the case of 
legal professionals distinguishing successfully one type of psychology expert from 
another. 
 Shanteau (1992) examined good and poor work-related performance of 
experienced professionals in many occupations and found that court judges, among 
others, were particularly susceptible to rendering suboptimal decisions. Shanteau’s work 
was driven by an interest in examining two contradictory schools of thought on expertise 
development and experts’ decision making ability. One view is that experts’ decisions are 
often flawed as a result of the biasing effects of heuristics on judgments.  The other is that 
experts’ cognitive functioning sets their performance above that of novices’ performance 
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on every level. Shanteau developed the Theory of Expert Competence that incorporated 
the views of both “heuristics and biases” researchers and cognitive science researchers 
such that acquiring a level of expertise does not guarantee that professionals’ decisions 
are flawless. Shanteau posits that experts’ competence depends on the task they are 
performing.  
Characteristics of tasks that are conducive to expert competence include 
predictable, routine problems in which feedback, decision aids, static stimuli, and 
objective analyses are available (Shanteau, 1992).  Shanteau found that court judges are 
among those who are routinely faced with unique tasks in a dynamic environment where 
decision aids are rare, feedback is not readily available, and they expect to make few if 
any errors in their decisions. Interestingly, he also identified clinical psychologists as 
experts who were prone to errors in judgment and decision making. These findings 
highlight that examining domain specific tasks in individuals who routinely perform 
these tasks is critical in identifying barriers to competent task performance, such as 
properly evaluating psychology experts’ credentials.  
In addition to judges, the current study includes a sample of criminal trial 
attorneys (both defense and prosecutors). Other than being a convenience sample as they 
were more accessible than judges, attorneys were included because they are critical 
decision makers in the process that allows experts to testify in a court of law. That is, 
attorneys must first retain and submit a potential expert to the judge who then renders an 
initial admissibility decision on the basis of the expert’s experience and credentials. 
Attorneys are expected to perform similarly to judges when selecting possible expert 
witnesses due to the similarity of their education and training. Specifically, their legal 
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training and current professions have provided both groups (judges and attorneys) with 
the motivation to choose potential expert witnesses wisely.  However, their training may 
not have adequately equipped them with the requisite knowledge to distinguish between 
psychology experts’ areas of specialty. For that reason, legal professionals were expected 
to rely more on peripheral cues to expertise, such as previous experience testifying, to 
make expert witness decisions rather than relying on central cues such as the expert’s 
area of expertise and publication record.  
As indicated earlier, the current study is the first to examine legal professionals’ 
“gatekeeper” abilities when presented with ‘real-world’ material (expert witness CVs). 
Despite the fact that legal professionals typically base their initial expert witness 
decisions solely on experts’ CVs, research thus far has neglected including this type of 
material in research on expert witness admissibility decisions. In most legal settings the 
judge does not actually hear an expert’s testimony until an initial decision to accept the 
expert has been made. Judges’ decisions, therefore, are likely based on information in the 
expert’s curriculum vitae (e.g., the expert’s qualifications including whether s/he has 
previously testified as an expert). Arguably, applying legal standards of admissibility 
may be difficult when presented with material, such as a CV, that shows only indirect 
indicators of general acceptance in the scientific community and/or falsifiability of the 
expert’s research. It appears, therefore, that the extent to which judges can infer the 
quality of scientific expert testimony from potential psychology experts’ CVs  may be 
directly related to the quality of their admissibility decisions. Moreover, the extent to 
which attorneys can make similar inferences may predict the quality of their expert 
witness hiring decisions and the quality of any cross-examination of the expert.  
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The Current Study 
The foci of the current study were to determine which cues (systematic/central vs. 
heuristic/peripheral) legal professionals (judges and attorneys) would rely on to identify 
an appropriate psychology expert for a particular criminal case, and whether they differed 
from novices (undergraduate psychology students) in this ability. Specifically, I 
manipulated and assessed the relative importance of a heuristic/peripheral cue (prior 
expert witness experience) and systematic/central cues (expert’s area of expertise and 
scholarly publication record) in their respective decisions. I further examined the relative 
importance of the legal criteria for expert witness admissibility and legal professionals’ 
confidence in their expert witness decisions to determine which variables may explain the 
underlying decision making processes.  
To test the hypothesis that knowledge plays an important role in quality expert 
witness admissibility decisions, the current study compared legal professionals with 
individuals that have psychology training/knowledge (psychology students) relevant to 
evaluating properly psychology experts’ CVs. Specifically, the ELM predicts that only 
under conditions when legal professionals are motivated and possess requisite knowledge 
will decisions be based on central, relevant information. In the case of expert witness 
admissibility decisions based on experts’ CVs, the central route to persuasion should 
include a consideration of scholarly publication record and area of expertise.  The current 
study allowed for assessment of the relative impact of systematic/central information 
(area of expertise and scholarly publication record) compared to heuristic/peripheral 
information (prior expert witness testimony experience). To assess the level of 
motivation, participants complete a detailed post hoc questionnaire (Appendix C).  
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Hypothesis 1. Judges and attorneys will focus on, thus be more likely to choose, a 
psychology expert who has previous expert witness experience than an expert without 
such experience regardless of the expert’s specialty (clinical forensic psychology vs. 
experimental legal psychology).  
Hypothesis 2.  Judges and attorneys will be more likely to choose an expert with 
a high scholarly publication record than an expert with no publication record regardless 
of the expert’s specialty.  
Hypothesis 3. Judges and attorneys will be most likely to choose an expert with a 
combination of a high scholarly publication record and previous experience as an expert 
witness than any other combination regardless of the expert’s specialty. 
Hypothesis 4.   Unlike judges and attorneys, psychology students will choose the 
psychology expert whose area of expertise  is the best match for the case regardless of the 
expert’s publication record or prior expert witness testimony experience.  
Hypothesis 5.  Psychology students will choose the expert whose area of 
expertise matches the case issues, has a high scholarly publication record, and previous 
experience as an expert witness more frequently than any other combination, and more 
frequently than will judges and attorneys. 
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Chapter II 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred fifty legal professionals were recruited through the National 
Association of Judges and professional contacts across the United States. They were 
criminal court judges (n = 79) and criminal trial attorneys (n = 81) who were asked to 
participate in a study on “Judging Expert Witnesses.” They were predominantly male 
(74%; 26% female), White/Caucasian (74%; 2% Latino; 24% no response), and ranged in 
age from 36 to 80 years old (M = 59, SD = 9). Their length of experience as legal 
professionals ranged from 2 to 43 years (M = 26, SD = 11).  
Four hundred sixty eight undergraduate psychology students were recruited 
through the Florida International University Psychology Department participant pool. In 
exchange for participating in the study, students were given course credit through Sona 
Systems, the Psychology Department Research Management system. The sample was 
predominantly female (70%; 30% male), Latino (67%; 12% African-American; 11% 
White/Caucasian; and 10% Other), and ranged in age from 17 to 45 years (M = 22, SD = 
11).  Most of the sample (32%) was in their junior year in college (29% Freshman, 16% 
Sophomore; and 23% Senior). 
Design 
A between-participants 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal 
psychology) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical psychology vs. experimental legal 
psychology) x 2 (high scholarly publication record vs. no publications) x 2 (previously 
testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified) factorial design was used. The 
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central dependent measure was a dichotomous decision in which “Yes, Dr. Jones is an 
expert in the area of proffered testimony,” or “No, Dr. Jones is not an expert in the area 
of proffered testimony,” were the only two options.  
Other essential dependent measures assessed the frequency of correct expert 
witness decisions, ratings of how likely participants were to choose the expert witness to 
testify in the case provided, how confident they were in their decisions, and the extent to 
which participants believed expert’s credentials met the legal standards of expert witness  
admissibility. Those items consisted of a series of statements in which participants were  
asked to rate their level of agreement with each statement on a 1 through 7 Likert-type 
scale with 1 being “strongly disagree” and 7 being “strongly agree.”  
Materials 
Stimulus case. Participants were presented with one of two stimulus cases (see 
Appendix A) that were summarized and modified versions of People v. Champagne 
Smith (People v. Smith, 2004), an actual second degree murder case from New York.  
The first version called for a legal psychologist specializing in eyewitness memory. 
Eyewitness testimony was a central issue in the original case. The second version of the 
case called for a clinical psychologist specializing in evaluating the defendant’s mental 
health and was created based on the modifications made to the first version. This was 
done in order to keep differences between the two cases to a minimum. As the 
defendant’s mental health was a central issue in the clinical case version, defense counsel 
needed to retain a clinical psychology expert. Modifications to both cases included 
changing details such as the defendant’s name, witness’ names, the location where the 
crime took place, when it occurred, the weapon used to commit the crime, and the case 
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issues requiring expert witness testimony. Modifications were minor but were made to 
make the case more general thus undetectable through internet searches. The case 
summary was presented to participants in written form. 
Expert witness testimony. General areas of proffered expert witness testimony 
were provided to participants to ensure that they were aware that the expert must be 
qualified to provide a particular type of scientific testimony (eyewitness memory or 
mental health testimony). Expert witness testimony was presented in written form along 
with the corresponding case scenario (See Appendix A). The legal psychologist’s expert 
witness testimony was adapted from the original case (People v. Smith, 2004) and was 
modified slightly to reflect current research in the area of eyewitness memory. The 
clinical psychologist’s testimony was created to reflect empirical research on mental 
health issues relevant to the defendant’s culpability in the case. 
Curricula vitae. Participants were presented with one of eight curricula vitae 
depending upon assigned experimental condition (Appendix B). Depending on the 
version of the stimulus case participants received, the case called for either expert witness 
testimony from an eyewitness identification expert or that of a clinical psychologist. Both 
types of experts’ CVs reflected that they currently held university faculty positions. The 
“matching” CV was that of the psychologist whose area of specialization matched the 
provided stimulus case version.  The “no match” CV was that of the psychologist whose 
area of specialization did not match the stimulus case version. That is, no match occurred 
when the legal psychology expert’s CV was presented in conjunction with the stimulus 
case/testimony version that called for a clinical psychologist and vice versa. 
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In the high-scholarly-publication-record condition, the expert had a list of 30 
publications whereas in the no-scholarly-publication-record condition, the expert had no 
publications. In the previously-testified-as-an-expert-witness condition, there was a line 
on the CV stating, “Court-appointed expert witness in over 50 cases,” whereas in the 
never-before-testified condition the line was, “No previous expert witness testimony 
experience.” 
Procedure 
The study was administered via the online survey software, Qualtrics.  
Participants received an email with basic information about the study. If interested in 
participating, they were asked to click on a link allowing them to access the study. The 
link was provided to legal professionals (judges and attorneys only) via email. It was 
simultaneously provided to undergraduate students who were recruited to participate 
through Sona Systems, the Florida International University Psychology Department 
online research management system.  
Upon entering the study, the first page provided a general introduction explaining 
that participants were asked to read a criminal case scenario, view an expert witness’s 
CV, and answer some questions. Participants were then asked to read the consent form. 
Implied informed consent was given when participants clicked on the “I consent” button 
at the bottom of the consent form page. Participants were able to exit the study at any 
time by simply closing their browser window. Participants were assigned randomly to the 
various experimental conditions.  
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The next web page presented the assigned case scenario and expert witness 
testimony. Participants were advised that they were about to read a criminal case scenario 
in which the defendant was charged with second degree murder. They were further 
informed that after reading the case scenario, they would be asked to view a potential 
expert witness’s CV to determine if the expert was acceptable to testify in the case. Legal 
professionals were instructed that they should approach the task as they would normally 
in their roles as judges and attorneys. Student participants were instructed that they 
should approach the task in the way they thought was most effective for helping them 
evaluate the expert’s credentials. For all materials presented, participants had unlimited 
time to view them and worked through the study at their own pace. 
 After reading the case scenario and proposed testimony, participants were 
presented with an expert witness CV.  After reading the CV, each participant was asked 
whether s/he believed Dr. Jones was, in fact, an expert in the proffered area of testimony 
followed by a series of questions about whether Dr. Jones’ qualifications met certain 
admissibility criteria for an expert witness in that specific case (see Appendix C). Once 
participants responded to all of the questions, they were directed to a page where they 
were asked a set of demographic questions such as age, education, etc.  
Upon completion of the experiment participants were directed to a debriefing 
page and thanked for their participation. They were also provided the option to email the 
researcher if they were interested in the study outcomes or in participating in future 
research on expert witness testimony. 
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Chapter III 
Results 
Analyses were first conducted separately for students and legal professionals. 
Comparisons were then made between the two groups on their study responses. Since the 
primary dependent variable in this study was a dichotomous variable (Dr. Jones is an 
expert/is not an expert), the first set of analyses tested the effects of all four independent 
variables on this outcome variable using logistic regression. The second set of analyses 
also consisted of a logistic regression on the dichotomous outcome variable of whether 
the expert witness decision was a correct match. The third set of analyses examined the 
effects of all four independent variables on how confident participants were in their 
decision to accept or reject the expert, how qualified they thought the expert was, how 
knowledgeable and motivated participants rated themselves in choosing an expert, and 
what aspects of the expert’s credentials were most influential in participants’ decision-
making processes. These results were analyzed using MANOVAs.  
Across all conditions and participants, Qualtrics effectively randomized the 
presentation of the stimulus case and the curricula vitae. That is, each case scenario 
(clinical psychologist required vs. legal psychologist required) was presented to all 
participants with nearly equal frequency (M = 51%, SD = 50%). The curriculum vitae 
matched the case scenario presented in terms of required area of expertise approximately 
half of the time (M = 49%, SD = 50%).  
Student Participants 
Expert witness decisions. Approximately three-fourths of the student participants 
judged Dr. Jones an expert (M = .74, SD = .44) regardless of whether the curriculum 
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vitae matched the presented case scenario. For the purpose of this study, an expert 
witness decision was considered “correct” when the participant either correctly accepted 
or correctly rejected the expert depending upon whether there was a match between 
required area of expertise and the case scenario or not.  Specifically, if the case scenario 
and area of expertise listed on the CV matched (eyewitness scenario and legal 
psychology expert; or mental health case and clinical psychology expert), a correct 
decision was to decide that Dr. Jones was an expert. If there was no match between the 
case scenario and expert witness CV and the participant rejected Dr. Jones as an expert, 
this was also considered a correct response. All other decisions were considered 
incorrect. Students made a correct expert witness decision in 51% of the cases. That is, 
they correctly accepted Dr. Jones as an expert in 35% of the cases, and correctly rejected 
Dr. Jones as an expert in 16% of the cases. 
Initially, data were analyzed using a logistic regression to determine the effects of 
stimulus case, area of psychology expertise, previous expert witness testimony, and 
publication record on whether participants considered Dr. Jones an expert regardless of 
whether the stimulus case and CV matched in area of expertise.  A test of model fit was 
significant (χ2(4) = 36.70, p < .01) indicating that stimulus case (p < .05), previous expert 
witness testimony (p < .01), and publication record (p < .05) all significantly predicted 
whether participants would label Dr. Jones an expert, regardless of whether it was a 
correct decision.  
Subsequent post hoc comparisons revealed that when participants were presented 
with the clinical psychology stimulus case, they were significantly more likely to judge 
the doctor an expert (χ2(1) = 5.12, p < .05) than when presented with the 
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legal/experimental psychology case scenario. Post hoc comparisons also revealed that 
when presented with a CV that listed previous expert testimony experience, student 
participants were significantly more likely to judge Dr. Jones an expert (χ2(1) = 20.04, p 
<  .01) than when presented with a CV that showed no previous expert testimony 
experience. Finally, when participants were presented with a CV that listed publications 
as opposed to no publications, they were significantly more likely to judge Dr. Jones an 
expert (χ2(1) = 9.00, p < .01). 
Table 1 includes the results for each of the variables that predicted significantly 
whether participants judged Dr. Jones an expert regardless of whether it was a correct 
decision. The effect sizes are reported as Exp(B) and show that participants who were 
presented with a CV that listed previous expert witness testimony were 2.7 times more 
likely to accept Dr. Jones as an expert regardless of the area of psychology expertise 
listed on the CV. Publication record was the second most influential factor indicating that 
participants were 1.8 times more likely to accept Dr. Jones as an expert when the CV 
included a list of 30 publications compared to none regardless of whether those 
publications were in the required area of expertise.  
A second logistic regression was then performed to determine whether stimulus 
case, area of psychology expertise, previous expert witness testimony, and publication 
record predicted when participants made a correct expert witness decision. That is, 
whether their decision reflected an accurate match of case and area of expertise.  A test of 
model fit was significant (χ2(4) = 14.41, p < .01) indicating that at least one of the 
independent variables reliably predicted when participants correctly judged Dr. Jones an 
expert. Stimulus case (p < .05) was the only variable that predicted significantly whether 
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participants made a correct expert witness decision. Post hoc comparisons revealed that 
participants presented with the clinical psychology stimulus case were significantly more 
likely to make a correct expert witness decision (χ2(1) = 8.73, p < .01) than those 
presented with the legal/experimental psychology case scenario.  
Confidence in decision and likelihood of choosing expert. All participants were 
asked to rate their level of confidence in their expert witness decisions on a 1 through 11 
Likert-type rating scale with 1 being “not at all confident” and 11 being “completely 
confident.” Across all conditions, students’ overall confidence was high (M = 8.19, SD = 
1.82).  Students were also asked to rate the likelihood that they would choose Dr. Jones to 
testify on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 being “not at all likely” and 7 being 
“entirely likely.” Across all conditions, participants were highly likely (M = 4.95, SD = 
1.44) to choose Dr. Jones to provide expert testimony in the case regardless of area of 
expertise.  
A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical 
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high number of scholarly publications vs. no 
publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified) 
MANOVA was conducted to determine which, if any, of these variables had a significant 
impact on participants’ level of confidence and their likelihood of choosing Dr. Jones to 
testify. Multivariate test results revealed significant effects of stimulus case, (F(2, 449) = 
4.79, p < .05); previous expert witness testimony experience (F(2, 449) = 3.83 p < .05);  
and publications (F(2, 449) = 5.35, p < .01).  
Univariate post hoc comparisons revealed that participants who received the 
clinical psychology case scenario were significantly more confident in their expert 
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witness decisions (F(1, 450) = 5.27, p < .05) , and were significantly more likely to 
choose Dr. Jones to testify (F(1, 450) = 8.16, p < .01) than those who received the 
eyewitness memory case scenario, regardless of Dr. Jones’ area of expertise.  
A univariate main effect of previous expert witness testimony experience on 
likelihood of choosing the expert to testify was also found showing that participants were 
more likely to choose Dr. Jones to testify when the CV listed previous expert witness 
testimony experience compared to no experience (F(1, 450) = 6.35, p < .05). When 
participants were presented with a CV listing publications, confidence in their decisions 
was significantly higher (F(1, 450) = 5.08, p < .05), and likelihood to choose the doctor 
was significantly higher (F(1, 450) = 9.65, p < .01), compared to no publications, 
regardless of area of expertise.   
 Expert witness admissibility criteria. Participants were also asked a series of 
questions about legal criteria for admissibility that judges use to determine expert 
testimony admissibility. These items were adapted from the standards set forth in Frye 
and Daubert and were formatted as statements in which participants were asked to rate 
their level of agreement with each statement on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 
being “strongly disagree” and 7 being “strongly agree.” For example, participants rated 
the expert on competence in the area of expertise proffered, and on possessing the 
requisite skills, training, education, knowledge, and experience to qualify as an expert.  
A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical 
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high scholarly publication record vs. no 
publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified) 
MANOVA was conducted to determine which, if any, of these variables had a significant 
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impact on participants’ ratings on the 10 expert witness admissibility criteria items.  
Results of the multivariate tests showed there was a significant effect of previous expert 
witness testimony experience on the overall level of agreement that the expert met the 
legal criteria for testimony admissibility, (F(10, 405) = 4.04, p < .01).   
Follow-up univariate analyses revealed that participants were significantly more 
likely to say that the expert had the required experience to impart reliable information at 
trial when the expert’s CV showed previous expert witness testimony experience, (F(1, 
414) = 20.70, p < .01) than when there was no previous expert testimony experience 
listed. There were no other main effects or significant interactions. 
Importance of expert’s credentials.  A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. 
experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 
(high scholarly publication record vs. no publications) x 2 (previously testified as an 
expert witness vs. never before testified) MANOVA was then conducted to determine 
which, if any, of these variables had a significant impact on participants’ ratings. Results 
of the multivariate test revealed a significant main effect of stimulus case on participants’ 
ratings of the importance of the expert’s credentials, (F(6, 425) = 3.67, p < .01).  There 
was also a significant main effect of publication record (F(6, 425) = 2.23, p < .05).  There 
were no other main effects or significant interactions among any of the variables.  
Post hoc comparisons revealed that when presented with the clinical psychology 
as opposed to the eyewitness memory case scenario, participants rated significantly 
higher the importance of the expert’s educational background (F(1, 430) = 6.76, p < .05), 
the expert’s previous experience as an expert witness, (F(1, 430) = 3.74, p = .05), and 
whether the CV represented a typical expert witness CV, (F(1, 430) = 8.13, p < .01).  
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Findings also showed that when the CV had a list of publications, participants were 
significantly more likely to rate it as representative of a typical expert witness CV 
compared to the CV without publications (F(1, 430) = 7.41, p < .01). 
 Participants’ motivation, knowledge, and ability. Participants also rated their 
level of agreement with statements related to their ability, knowledge, and motivation to 
choose an appropriate expert witness for the case. Ratings were recorded on a 1 through 7 
Likert-type scale with 1 being “strongly disagree” through 7 being “strongly agree.” 
Students rated themselves highly on ability (M = 4.45, SD = 1.33), knowledge (M = 4.43 
SD = 1.33), and motivation (M = 5.04, SD = 1.30) to choose an appropriate expert 
witness for the case regardless of which case scenario they received. 
To determine what effect, if any, the study’s independent variables had on 
participants’ ratings, a 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of 
expertise: clinical psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high number of scholarly 
publications vs. no publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never 
before testified) MANOVA was conducted. There were no significant main effects of any 
of the independent variables on participants’ self-ratings and there were no significant 
interactions. 
Legal Professionals (Attorneys and Judges) 
Initially, data were analyzed separately for judges and attorneys following the 
same analysis structure as the student sample. As predicted, results indicated no 
significant differences between judges and attorneys for any of the main outcome 
variables. Data were therefore collapsed across the two legal professionals’ groups 
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(attorneys and judges) for all subsequent analyses. All data were analyzed following the 
same sequence of analyses used for the student sample. 
Expert witness decisions. Approximately two-thirds of the legal professionals 
judged Dr. Jones an expert (M = .66, SD = .48) regardless of whether the curriculum 
vitae matched the presented case scenario. First, a logistic regression was used to 
determine the effects of stimulus case, area of psychology expertise, previous expert 
witness testimony, and publication record on expert witness decisions. A test of model fit 
was significant, χ2(4) = 15.66, p < .01, indicating that the independent variables reliably 
predicted when participants would respond that Dr. Jones was an expert. Table 2 shows 
that area of expertise (p = .01) and previous expert witness testimony (p < .05) predicted 
significantly whether legal professionals would label Dr. Jones an expert.  
Post hoc comparisons revealed that when Dr. Jones’ CV stated the area of 
expertise was eyewitness memory, legal professionals were significantly more likely to 
determine that Dr. Jones was an expert (χ2(1) = 6.67, p < .01) regardless of which version 
of the stimulus case they received. Moreover, when Dr. Jones had previous expert 
witness testimony experience, legal professionals were significantly more likely to judge 
Dr. Jones an expert (χ2(1) = 3.63, p = .05). 
Legal professionals made a correct expert witness decision in 58% of the cases. 
That is, they correctly accepted Dr. Jones as an expert in 34% of the cases and correctly 
rejected Dr. Jones in 24% of the cases. A second logistic regression was used to 
determine the effects of stimulus case, area of psychology expertise, previous expert 
witness testimony, and publication record on correct expert witness decisions. A test of 
model fit was significant, (χ2(4) = 19.21, p < .01), indicating that the variables reliably 
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predicted when legal professionals made a correct expert witness decision. Area of 
expertise (p < .01) predicted significantly whether participants made a correct expert 
witness decision. Follow up comparisons revealed that when Dr. Jones’ CV listed 
expertise in eyewitness memory, legal professionals were significantly more likely to 
make a correct expert witness decision (χ2(1) = 17.97, p < .01)  
Confidence in decision and likelihood of choosing expert. Legal professionals 
were asked to rate their level of confidence in their expert witness decisions on a 1 
through 11 Likert-type rating scale with 1 being “not at all confident” and 11 being 
“completely confident.” Across all conditions, reported confidence was high (M = 8.68, 
SD = 1.81) overall.  Legal professionals also rated the likelihood with which they would 
choose Dr. Jones to testify on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 being “not at all 
likely” and 7 being “entirely likely.” Across all conditions, legal professionals were 
highly likely (M = 4.46, SD = 1.98) to choose Dr. Jones to provide expert testimony in 
this case regardless of area of expertise.   
A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical 
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (scholarly publications vs. no publications) x 2 
(previously testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified) MANOVA was 
conducted to determine which, if any, of these variables had a significant impact on legal 
professionals’ level of confidence and their likelihood of choosing Dr. Jones to testify. 
Multivariate test results revealed significant effects of stimulus case, (F(2, 135) = 3.94, p 
< .05); area of expertise, (F(2, 135) = 3.57, p < .05); and previous expert witness 
testimony experience (F(2, 135) = 9.74, p < .01). There was a significant interaction 
between previous expert testimony experience and publications, (F(2, 135) = 14.28, p < 
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.01).  Follow-up univariate analyses revealed that when Dr. Jones’ CV contained both 
previous expert testimony experience and publications, legal professionals were 
significantly more likely to hire/allow Dr. Jones to testify than when either or both were 
missing from the CV, (F(1, 136) = 23.89, p < .01).  
Expert witness admissibility criteria. Legal professionals were also asked a 
series of questions about legal criteria for admissibility that are used to determine the 
admissibility of expert testimony in a given area.  Participants were asked to rate their 
level of agreement with each item on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 being 
“strongly disagree” and 7 being “strongly agree.”  
A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical 
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high scholarly publication record vs. no 
publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never testified) MANOVA 
was conducted to determine which, if any, of these variables had a significant impact on 
legal professionals’ ratings.  Results of the multivariate tests showed there was a 
significant effect of stimulus case (F(10, 121) = 3.56, p < .01), area of expertise (F(10, 
121) = 9.68, p < .01) previous expert witness testimony experience (F(10, 121) = 4.63, p 
< .01), and publication record (F(10, 121) = 8.77, p < .01) on the overall level of 
agreement that the expert met the legal criteria for testimony admissibility. Tables 3 
through 6 list legal professionals’ responses to the admissibility criteria items and the 
results for each independent variable on each of the legal criteria dependent variables. 
Specifically, Table 3 shows the significant post hoc comparisons of the univariate effect 
of stimulus case on each of the legal criteria items. Table 4 shows the same for area of 
expertise, Table 5 shows the effect of previous expert witness testimony experience, and 
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Table 6 shows the significant univariate effect of publication record on each of the 
admissibility criteria items.  
Multivariate tests also revealed a significant interaction between stimulus case 
and area of expertise (F(10, 121) = 5.09, p < .01) such that when presented with a 
matching clinical psychology stimulus case and CV, legal professionals were 
significantly more likely to agree that the expert met the admissibility criteria than when 
presented with a stimulus case and CV that did not match on required expertise. There 
was a significant interaction between area of expertise and publication record (F(10, 121) 
= 5.74, p < .01). Post hoc comparisons revealed when the area of expertise was clinical 
psychology and the CV had a list of publications, legal professionals were significantly 
more likely to agree that the expert met the admissibility criteria than when presented 
with an experimental/legal psychology CV with no publications regardless of the 
required testimony detailed in the case scenario. There was also a significant interaction 
between previous expert witness testimony and publication record (F(10, 121) = 4.09, p <  
.01) such that legal professionals were significantly more likely to agree that the expert 
met the admissibility criteria when the CV listed a combination of previous expert 
testimony experience and  publications than when either or both was missing.  
Importance of expert’s credentials. Legal professionals were asked to rate the 
importance of the expert’s academic credentials, academic training, previous experience 
as an expert, professional experience, and area of expertise when considering whether the 
doctor was an expert. Ratings were recorded on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 
being “not at all important” and 7 being “extremely important.” Participants also rated 
their level of agreement that the CV was representative of a typical expert witness CV. 
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These ratings were recorded on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 being “strongly 
disagree” to 7 being “strongly agree.” Legal professionals rated highly the importance of 
specific area of expertise (M = 5.76, SD = 1.35), the area of academic training (M = 5.62, 
SD = .84), the expert’s academic credentials (M = 5.26, SD = .87), professional 
credentials (M = 5.21, SD = 1.22), and experience as an expert witness (M = 4.80, SD = 
1.94), in their decision-making. They also rated highly their level of agreement (M = 
4.27, SD = 1.65) that the presented CV resembled a typical expert witness CV. 
A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical 
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high scholarly publication record vs. no 
publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified) 
MANOVA was then conducted to determine which, if any, of these variables had a 
significant impact on these participant ratings. There was a significant main effect of 
stimulus case on legal professionals’ ratings of the importance of the expert’s credentials, 
(F(6, 122) = 4.34, p < .01), such that when presented with the clinical psychology case 
scenario, legal professionals were  significantly more likely to rate higher the overall 
importance of the expert’s credentials in their expert witness decisions compared to an 
eyewitness memory case. There was also a significant main effect of publication record 
(F(6, 122) = 5.08, p < .01).  There were no other main effects or interactions.   
Follow-up univariate analyses revealed a main effect of stimulus case. When 
presented with the clinical psychology case scenario rather than the eyewitness memory 
case scenario, legal professionals rated significantly higher the importance of the expert’s 
educational background (F(1, 127) = 13.54, p < .01.  Legal professionals were also 
significantly more likely to rate Dr. Jones’ CV representative of a typical expert witness 
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CV when it included a list of several publications than none, regardless of area of 
expertise (F(1, 127) = 5.13, p < .05).  
Participants’ motivation, knowledge, and ability. Participants were asked to 
rate their level of agreement with statements related to their ability, knowledge, and 
motivation to choose an appropriate expert witness for the case. Ratings were recorded on 
a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 being “strongly disagree” through 7 being 
“strongly agree.” Results showed that participants rated themselves highly on ability (M 
= 5.54, SD = 1.36), knowledge (M = 5.70 SD = 1.38), and motivation (M = 5.91, SD = 
1.27). 
To determine what effect, if any, the independent variables had on participants’ 
ratings, a 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical 
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high scholarly publication record vs. no 
publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified) 
MANOVA was conducted. There were no significant main effects of the independent 
variables on legal professionals’ self-ratings and there were no significant interactions. 
Comparisons between students and legal professionals 
 Expert witness decisions. A logistic regression was conducted to examine 
whether there were significant differences between undergraduate psychology students 
and legal professionals in their responses to the question, “Is Dr. Jones an expert?” 
Results showed that there was no significant difference between students and legal 
professionals in the frequency with which each identified Dr. Jones as an expert (M = 
74%, SD = 44% vs. M = 66%, SD = 48%, respectively), regardless of whether there was a 
match in area of expertise between the presented case scenario and the area of expertise 
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listed on the CV.  A logistic regression was also used to examine whether a difference 
existed in the percentage of correct expert decisions between the two groups. There was 
no significant difference between the percentage of students’ and legal professionals’ 
correct expert witness decisions (M = 51%, SD = 50% vs. M = 55%, SD = 50%, 
respectively).   
 Confidence in decision and likelihood of choosing expert. A MANOVA was 
then conducted using participant group (students vs. legal professionals) as the sole 
independent variable to determine whether there were any differences between students 
and legal professionals regarding decision confidence and the likelihood of 
choosing/allowing the expert to testify. Multivariate tests showed there was a significant 
difference between students and legal professionals in the level of confidence in their 
decisions, and in the likelihood that they would choose the expert to testify (F(2, 613) = 
14.43, p < .01).  
 Post hoc comparisons of the univariate effects revealed that legal professionals 
expressed significantly higher confidence (F(1, 614) = 8.28, p < .01) in their decisions 
than did students.  In contrast, students were significantly more likely than legal 
professionals to allow Dr. Jones to testify (F(1, 614) = 10.77, p < .01). 
 Expert witness admissibility criteria. To determine whether students and legal 
professionals differed in their responses to the admissibility criteria questions, a 
MANOVA was conducted. Results showed that there were significant differences 
between legal professionals and students for each of the ten admissibility criteria items 
(F(10, 563) = 20.58, p < .01).  
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 Univariate post hoc analyses revealed that students were significantly more likely 
than legal professionals to rate the expert as competent in the area of expertise (F(1, 572) 
= 13.85, p < .01); in possessing the requisite skills, (F(1, 572) = 27.57, p < .01), 
education (F(1, 572) = 21.35, p < .01), and training, (F(1, 572) = 10.42, p < .01); in 
possessing the requisite knowledge (F(1, 572) = 48.67, p < .01) and experience (F(1, 
572) = 35.22, p < .01); and that the testimony was based on scientific procedures (F(1, 
572) = 20.94, p < .01) and scientific principles (F(1, 572) = 6.80, p < .01). Conversely, 
legal professionals were significantly more likely than students to report that the expert’s 
testimony was beyond the knowledge of the jury (F(1, 572) = 53.78, p < .01), and that the 
testimony was relevant to the issues and facts of the case (F(1, 572) = 17.40, p < .01). 
 Importance of expert’s credentials. A MANOVA was conducted to examine 
any differences between the two groups’ ratings of importance of the expert’s credentials 
and whether the expert’s CV resembled a typical expert witness CV. Results revealed that 
there was a significant difference between the two groups (F(6, 580) = 18.17, p < .01). 
Post hoc comparisons revealed that students placed significantly higher importance than 
legal professionals on the expert’s academic credentials (F(1, 586) = 12.90, p < .01); 
professional credentials F(1, 586) = 32.58, p < .01); and previous expert witness 
experience (F(1, 586) = 62.33, p < .01). There was no difference between the two groups 
on ratings of importance of the expert’s specific area of academic training or specific area 
of expertise. Post hoc comparisons of whether the expert’s CV resembled a typical expert 
witness CV showed that students were significantly more likely than legal professionals 
to agree that it did (F(1, 586) = 15.00, p < .01). 
 40 
 
Participants’ motivation, knowledge, and ability. Results of a MANOVA 
showed that there was a significant difference between the two groups on their ratings of 
motivation, ability, and possessing the knowledge to choose an appropriate expert 
witness (F(3, 581) = 32.44, p < .01). Post hoc comparisons revealed that legal 
professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students on motivation (F(1, 583) 
= 49.26, p < .01), knowledge (F(1, 583) = 73.69, p < .01), and ability (F(1, 583) = 93.10, 
p < .01) to choose an appropriate expert witness. 
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Table 1  
Factors that influenced students’ expert witness decisions         
 95% CI for Exp(B) 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig Exp(B) Lower Upper 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Step 1a Stim. Case -.539 .221 5.977 1 .014 .583 .378 .899 
 Area of Exp -.365 .219 2.768 1 .096 .694 .451 1.067 
 Testimony .976 .227 18.444 1 .000 2.653 1.700 4.140 
 Publications .604 .223 7.347 1 .007 1.830 1.182 2.833 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a. Variables entered on Step 1: Stimulus Case, Area of Expertise, Expert Witness Experience, Publication 
Record 
 
 42 
 
  
Table 2  
Factors that influenced legal professionals’ expert witness decisions       
 95% CI for Exp(B) 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig Exp(B) Lower Upper 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Step 1a Stim. Case -.627 .407 2.379 1 .123 .534 .241 1.185 
 Area of Exp  .981 .379 6.712 1 .010 2.670 1.270 5.605 
 Testimony  .908 .400 5.158 1 .023 2.479 1.132 5.436 
 Publications .700 .371 3.551 1 .060 2.013 .972 4.169 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a. Variables entered on Step 1: Stimulus Case, Area of Expertise, Expert Witness Experience, Publication Record 
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Table 3 
Legal professionals’ agreement that expert meets admissibility criteria by stimulus case         
Item                                   Stim Case                 M                 SE      
              95% CI 
      Lower       Upper 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Dr. is competent in the 
field of expertise  
Clinical Case 4.852 a .174 4.508 5.197 
Eyewitness Case 
 
4.393 a .152 4.092 4.693 
Dr. possesses requisite 
skills  
Clinical Case    4.710 .179 4.356 5.063 
Eyewitness Case 
 
   4.483 .156 4.174 4.792 
Dr.  possesses requisite 
training  
Clinical Case    4.800 .187 4.430 5.170 
Eyewitness Case 
 
   4.694 .164 4.370 5.017 
Dr. possesses requisite 
education 
Clinical Case    4.886 .198 4.493 5.278 
Eyewitness Case 
 
   5.036 .173 4.693 5.379 
Dr. possesses requisite 
knowledge 
Clinical Case    4.495 .180 4.138 4.852 
Eyewitness Case 
 
   4.412 .158 4.100 4.723 
Dr. possesses requisite 
experience 
Clinical Case 4.500a .189 4.126 4.874 
Eyewitness Case 
 
3.871a .165 3.544 4.198 
Testimony based on 
scientific principle 
Clinical Case      4.952 .141 4.673 5.231 
Eyewitness Case 
 
     4.754 .159 4.440 5.068 
Testimony based on  
scientific procedure  
Clinical Case       4.744 .142 4.463 5.024 
Eyewitness Case 
 
      4.591 .159 4.276 4.907 
Testimony beyond 
jurors’ knowledge 
Clinical Case    5.652a .135 5.384 5.920 
Eyewitness Case 
 
 6.173a .118 5.939 6.408 
Testimony relevant to 
case 
Clinical Case 5.567a .149 5.272 5.861 
Eyewitness Case 
 
6.014a .130 5.756 6.271 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
a. Mean difference significant at p < .05. 
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Table 4 
Legal professionals’ agreement that expert meets admissibility criteria by expertise area 
Item                                  Area of Expertise        M                 SE      
              95% CI 
       Lower      Upper 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Dr. is competent in the 
field of expertise  
Clinical  4.235 a .155 3.930 4.541 
Eyewitness  
 
5.139a .174 4.795 5.482 
Dr. possesses requisite 
skills  
Clinical  4.350 a .159 4.036 4.664 
Eyewitness  
 
4.925a .178 4.572 5.278 
Dr.  possesses requisite 
training  
Clinical  4.575 .166 4.246 4.904 
Eyewitness  
 
4.976 .187 4.606 5.346 
Dr. possesses requisite 
education 
Clinical  4.890 .176 4.541 5.238 
Eyewitness  
 
5.056 .198 4.664 5.447 
Dr. possesses requisite 
knowledge 
Clinical  4.288 .160 3.971 4.604 
Eyewitness 
  
4.675 .180 4.318 5.031 
Dr. possesses requisite 
experience 
Clinical  3.917 a .168 3.584 4.249 
Eyewitness  
 
4.544a .189 4.170 4.917 
Testimony based on 
scientific principle 
Clinical  4.288 .160 3.971 4.604 
Eyewitness  
 
4.675 .180 4.318 5.031 
Testimony based on  
scientific procedure  
Clinical  4.952 .141 4.673 5.231 
Eyewitness  
 
4.754 .159 4.440 5.068 
Testimony beyond 
jurors’ knowledge 
Clinical  6.008 .120 5.770 6.246 
Eyewitness  
 
5.786 .135 5.518 6.053 
Testimony relevant to 
case 
Clinical  5.871 .132 5.609 6.133 
Eyewitness 
 
5.683 .149 5.388 5.977 
______________________________________________________________________ 
a. Mean difference significant at p < .05 
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Table 5 
Legal professionals’ agreement that expert meets admissibility criteria by experience 
Item                                  Previous Exp               M                 SE      
            95% CI 
     Lower      Upper 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Dr. is competent in the 
field of expertise  
Previous Exp 5.000a .167 4.670 5.330 
No Exp  
 
4.245a .160 3.929 4.562 
Dr. possesses requisite 
skills  
Previous Exp 5.102a .171 4.763 5.441 
No Exp  
 
4.090a .164 3.765 4.416 
Dr.  possesses requisite 
training  
Previous Exp 5.241a .179 4.887 5.596 
No Exp  
 
4.252a .172 3.912 4.593 
Dr. possesses requisite 
education 
Previous Exp 5.262a .190 4.886 5.638 
No Exp  
 
4.660a .182 4.299 5.021 
Dr. possesses requisite 
knowledge 
Previous Exp 4.959a .173 4.618 5.301 
No Exp  
 
3.948a .166 3.620 4.276 
Dr. possesses requisite 
experience 
Previous Exp 4.704a .181 4.346 5.062 
No Exp  
 
3.667a .174 3.323 4.011 
Testimony based on 
scientific principle 
Previous Exp 5.241a .152 4.940 5.543 
No Exp  
 
4.493a .146 4.204 4.782 
Testimony based on  
scientific procedure  
Previous Exp 4.983a .153 4.680 5.285 
No Exp  
 
4.374a .147 4.083 4.664 
Testimony beyond 
jurors’ knowledge 
Previous Exp 6.054 .130 5.798 6.311 
No Exp  
 
5.771 .125 5.525 6.018 
Testimony relevant to 
case 
Previous Exp 5.942 .143 5.660 6.224 
No Exp  
 
5.638 .137 5.367 5.909 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
a. Mean difference significant at p < .05 
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Table 6 
Legal professionals’ agreement that expert meets admissibility criteria by publications 
Item                                  Previous Exp               M             SE      
95% CI 
       Lower     Upper 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Dr. is competent in the 
field of expertise  
No Publications 4.106a .175 3.759 4.452 
Publications 
 
5.010 a .154 4.707 5.314 
Dr. possesses requisite 
skills  
No Publications 4.058a .180 3.702 4.414 
Publications 
 
5.000 a .158 4.688 5.312 
Dr.  possesses requisite 
training  
No Publications 4.548 .188 4.176 4.921 
Publications 
 
4.896 .165 4.569 5.223 
Dr. possesses requisite 
education 
No Publications 4.617a .200 4.222 5.012 
Publications 
 
5.219 a .175 4.872 5.565 
Dr. possesses requisite 
knowledge 
No Publications 3.836a .182 3.477 4.195 
Publications 
 
4.917 a .159 4.602 5.232 
Dr. possesses requisite 
experience 
No Publications 3.821a .190 3.445 4.198 
Publications 
 
4.458 a .167 4.128 4.789 
Testimony based on 
scientific principle 
No Publications 4.704 .160 4.388 5.020 
Publications 
 
4.990 .140 4.712 5.267 
Testimony based on  
scientific procedure  
No Publications 4.597 .161 4.279 4.915 
Publications 
 
4.740 .141 4.461 5.019 
Testimony beyond 
jurors’ knowledge 
No Publications 6.102 .136 5.833 6.372 
Publications 
 
5.771 .120 5.534 6.007 
Testimony relevant to 
case 
No Publications 5.899 .150 5.603 6.196 
Publications 
 
5.708 .132 5.448 5.969 
______________________________________________________________________ 
a. Mean difference significant at p < .05 
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Chapter IV 
Discussion 
The primary objective of the current study was to determine which factors 
influenced legal professionals’ (judges and attorneys) ability to identify an appropriate 
psychology expert for a particular criminal case. The secondary purpose was to determine 
whether legal professionals differed from undergraduate psychology students in their 
ability to identify a suitable expert witness for a particular case. In contrast to what was 
hypothesized, students and legal professionals did not differ in how often they accepted 
Dr. Jones as an expert. Neither did they differ in the ability to select a psychology expert 
whose area of expertise was the best match for the case, regardless of the expert’s 
publication record or prior expert testimony.  It was also hypothesized that compared to 
legal professionals, psychology students would choose an expert who had a combination 
of scholarly publication record and previous experience as an expert witness more 
frequently than any other combination. None of these predictions were confirmed.  Most 
importantly, there was no significant difference between the two samples in correctly 
identifying an appropriate expert based on a match between area of expertise and the area 
of testimony required for the case. In fact, both groups matched correctly the expert’s 
area of expertise to the case only approximately half of the time (students, 51%; legal 
professionals, 58%).  
It was further hypothesized that legal professionals in particular would focus on, 
thus be more likely to choose, a psychology expert who had previous expert witness 
testimony experience than an expert without such experience, regardless of the expert’s 
area of expertise (clinical forensic psychology vs. experimental legal psychology).  Data 
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confirmed that legal professionals were more likely to think Dr. Jones was an expert 
when the CV listed prior experience testifying.  However, they were also influenced 
significantly by area of expertise. Specifically, only when Dr. Jones’ expertise was 
eyewitness memory were legal professionals more likely to correctly match the CV to the 
case. Additional hypotheses were that legal professionals would be more likely to choose 
an expert with publications rather than an expert with no publications, regardless of the 
expert’s specialty, and that they would be most likely to choose an expert with a 
combination of a high scholarly publication record and previous experience as an expert 
witness than any other combination regardless of the expert’s specialty. Both of these 
hypotheses were confirmed. 
Overall, findings show that both psychology students and legal professionals 
demonstrated suboptimal ability when matching a potential expert witness CV with a 
specific case. Interestingly, students’ matching performance was slightly better when 
presented with the clinical psychology case scenario, and legal professionals’ matching 
performance was slightly better when the CV presented was that of an eyewitness 
memory expert. However, there was no difference in how often each group identified Dr. 
Jones as an expert, regardless of whether there was a match between the area of expertise 
required by the case and that of the CV presented. Moreover, there was no difference 
between the groups in the rate of correct matches of the area of expertise required in the 
case to the area of expertise listed in the CV. Importantly however, legal professionals 
were significantly more confident in their expert witness decisions and ranked themselves 
higher in motivation, knowledge, and ability to choose an appropriate expert witness 
whereas students were more likely to allow the expert to testify. While students were also 
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more likely to rate the expert significantly higher on the Frye/Daubert criteria related to 
competence, education, and training, legal professionals rated the expert significantly 
higher in  providing testimony that was beyond the knowledge of the jury and that was 
relevant to the issues and facts of the case.  
Expert Witness Admissibility Decisions 
Taking into consideration that the case scenario and CV matched approximately 
50% of the time, participants were expected to be more conservative than they actually 
were in judging Dr. Jones an expert. Although legal professionals (66% said “Dr. is an 
expert”) were slightly more conservative than psychology students (74% said “Dr. is an 
expert”), the difference between the groups was not statistically significant. Correct 
expert witness decisions were made only approximately half of the time (students = 51%; 
legal professionals = 58%). Legal professionals performed slightly better than students, 
however, the difference between the two groups was not statistically significant.  
These results are consistent with those of previous researchers whose findings 
suggest that judges are not better than laypersons at identifying good science from “junk” 
science (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008). 
The present study extends the existing body of literature on judicial decision making such 
that when reproducing closely the conditions under which admissibility decisions are 
made, legal professionals appeared to under-utilize central cues to expertise such as 
matching area of expertise on the CV and the case scenario, and publications. They also 
appeared to over-utilize peripheral cues to expertise such as prior expert testimony 
experience and/or having a doctorate in psychology regardless of the area of psychology 
training/expertise. Despite the fact that psychology students appeared to use more central 
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cues (number of publications) in their expert witness decisions, the use of these cues did 
not translate into a better overall performance.  
These findings are particularly concerning given that judges’ and attorneys’ 
expert witness decisions may be critically important to the outcome of a case whether in 
criminal or civil court. However, the results are not entirely surprising given that legal 
professionals, in general, do not receive training in the wide variety of areas of 
psychology expertise. As such, any untrained individual would have difficulties 
distinguishing between the various areas of psychology graduate training as well as 
assessing the relative importance of area of expertise/training, number of publications, 
and prior expert witness testimony experience. Instead, judges’ and attorneys’ decisions 
appear to be based on criteria relevant in the legal arena, such as prior expert witness 
experience.  
As expected, when the expert’s CV showed previous expert witness testimony 
experience, it was an influential factor in legal professionals’ expert witness decisions. It 
is possible that this information may have overshadowed other and arguably more 
important information on the CV such as area of expertise and publication record. This 
may be attributable, in part, to the legal principle of stare decisis which holds that judges 
are obliged to respect prior decisions of other judges. These decisions constitute legal 
precedents and are typically related to case law. As such, judges’ and attorneys’ legal 
training may predispose them to apply this principle to all legal decision making, 
including retaining/admitting expert witnesses.   
When presented with a CV showing that the proffered expert had testified in court 
on several occasions, legal professionals may have deduced that many prior attorneys and 
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judges accepted Dr. Jones as a psychology expert.  Given legal professionals’ lack of 
psychology training, they may assume that all psychologists receive nearly identical 
training thus deducing that any psychologist who has previously been labeled “expert” 
will suffice. However, psychologists’ training differs widely depending on the area of 
study/specialization. Therefore, while following precedents set by other judges may be 
highly useful for many decisions in the legal arena, when choosing expert witnesses it 
facilitates the risk of repeating prior flawed decisions and on its own is not a safeguard 
against preventing pseudo-expertise from entering the courtroom. 
 Legal professionals were also influenced significantly by area of expertise 
indicating that stare decisis alone may not provide a complete explanation of their 
suboptimal expert witness decision making. Although legal professionals’ decisions were 
influenced by the area of expertise listed on the CV, they still made correct decisions in 
only 58% of the cases. Interestingly, legal professionals were significantly more likely to 
make a correct decision when the area of expertise on the CV was experimental legal 
psychology, suggesting that area of expertise was considered under some circumstances. 
It is possible that when presented with a CV showing an area of expertise 
(eyewitness memory) that is not encountered as often as “traditional” psychology (mental 
health) expertise, legal professionals performed better because they scrutinized the CV 
more closely.  According to Bargh (1984), novel or unexpected information/stimuli tend 
to generate more conscious attention and are processed deliberatively rather than 
automatically. In the context of the present study, legal professionals may have processed 
more deliberatively the CV of the less typical eyewitness expert, thus linking more 
accurately common features between the case requirements and the expert’s credentials. 
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This finding also implies that depending on area of expertise, expert witness decisions 
can be improved. 
Despite the fact that psychology students receive training in the various areas of 
psychology, in this study they were equally unable to select experts appropriately. That 
is, they were unable to distinguish between an acceptable and an unacceptable expert. 
Based on their training, it was predicted that students would outperform legal 
professionals in matching expert witness CVs to a particular case. It is possible however, 
that a more advanced level of psychology training may be required to distinguish 
between areas of psychology expertise than existed in the tested student sample. In line 
with this notion, and unlike legal professionals, students were more likely to make correct 
expert witness decisions if the case required a clinical psychology expert. This may be 
attributable to the level of familiarity undergraduate students have with clinical 
psychology as opposed to a more specialized area of psychology such as legal 
psychology. Arguably, undergraduate psychology students have more exposure to 
clinical psychology as part of their standard curriculum and the popular interest in it. 
Therefore, it may have been easier for students to recognize similarities between the 
clinical case scenario and a clinical psychologist’s CV than the legal case and matching 
experimental legal psychology CV. 
Expert Witness Admissibility Criteria.  
As expected, there was a significant difference between legal professionals and 
students in their use of the legal standards for admissibility criteria when evaluating the 
expert’s credentials and fitness to provide expert witness testimony. Compared to 
students, legal professionals were more conservative in agreeing that the expert met each 
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of the criteria. However, legal professionals’ level of agreement that the expert’s 
credentials and testimony met admissibility criteria was still rather high (see Tables 3-6). 
This cautiously suggests that judges and attorneys may have allowed/retained the expert 
to testify despite the fact that in approximately half of the cases the expert’s area of 
expertise did not represent a match to the case scenario. It also suggests that legal 
professionals, similar to students, struggled with evaluating properly the expert’s 
qualifications in accordance with the legal criteria for admissibility arguably because 
applying or inferring these criteria from experts’ CVs may require training/expertise 
beyond what legal professionals receive in law school. In fact, in could be argued that 
inferring scientific quality from any expert’s CV may require an expert of equally 
specific background or expertise who is familiar with the various academic degrees, areas 
of specialization, and outlets of scientific work.  The current data suggest that judges and 
attorneys are rendering “accurate” psychology expert witness decisions only 
approximately half of the time thus implying there is a high likelihood that pseudo 
psychology expertise is making its way into courtrooms nationwide. These findings are 
particularly troublesome given that the essence of the legal standards are to prevent false 
expertise in U.S. courtrooms via granting judges the gatekeepers of the testimony that is 
presented to the jury (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993).  
According to prior research, there is another potential downside to suboptimal 
expert witness decisions. Kovera and McAuliff (2000) found that judges admitted experts 
in less than 20% of the cases indicating that rather than admitting pseudo-
expertise/science, they were excluding high quality scientific psychology testimony. The 
admissibility rate found in the present study is considerably higher, even if not more 
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correct, which speaks to the importance of how expert witness admissibility decisions are 
measured. While Kovera and McAuliff (2000) presented judges with scientific study 
material, participants in the present study were presented with a CV from which to infer 
or deduce whether the expert was in a position to provide expert witness testimony in 
accordance with the legal admissibility criteria as set forth in Frye and Daubert. Given 
that initial real-world expert witness decisions are typically made based on expert CVs 
alone, the present findings indicate that past research may have underestimated the 
frequency with which flawed expert witness decisions are made in actuality. The present 
research is also a testament to varying methodologically how legal professionals’ 
decision making is tested to broaden the understanding of factors influencing legal 
decisions as well as the policy implications of the findings. 
Regardless of the actual rate of suboptimal expert witness decisions, any error in 
this area is troublesome given that the court and all parties to a legal matter may benefit 
from having suitable expert witnesses testify. The goal of such testimony is to augment 
jurors’ knowledge to aid the jury in rendering a true and just verdict. Unfortunately, by 
the time jurors are exposed to a pseudo-expert, it is unlikely that they will recognize 
his/her lack of expertise in the area of testimony given that the court deemed the person 
an expert (Schweitzer & Saks, 2009). If provided with expert testimony that is not 
suitable in the given case, and/or denied quality expert testimony, jurors’ decision making 
ability may be hindered. As a result, case outcomes may be affected adversely.  
Confidence and Fractionated Expertise   
Although legal professionals did not perform significantly better in rendering 
suitable expert witness decisions, they were significantly more confident in their 
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decisions than students. Judges and attorneys routinely evaluate expert witness CVs and 
make expert witness decisions. Their experience may account for the high level of 
confidence they reported in their expert witness decisions. The dissociation between 
confidence and the quality of one’s own task performance is in line with past research. 
For example, Marteau, Wynne, Kaye, and Evans (1990) found that experience in task 
performance increases confidence, however, when there is no feedback provided on how 
well the task was performed, skill/competence does not improve. The condition under 
which feedback most significantly enhances performance appears to be when feedback is 
provided immediately after an incorrect response is conveyed.  
Pashler, Cepeda, Wixted, and Rohrer (2005) examined the impact of various 
forms of feedback on associative learning and retention of information. The researchers 
highlighted a controversy in the field as to whether feedback actually enhances task 
performance as some research shows that it only improves performance during training 
(see Bjork, 1994; Carlson & Gilmore, 2000; Schmidt & Bjork, 1992). However, Pashler 
et al. pointed out that previous researchers provided feedback at the end of the learning 
task rather than immediately after participants provided an incorrect response.  When 
varying the timing of feedback and retention interval on a word learning task, Pashler and 
colleagues found that participants who received feedback (e.g., the correct response) 
immediately after providing an incorrect response performed significantly better during 
training than participants who received no feedback, or that received feedback at varying 
intervals. This was especially true when participants were given time to process why their 
own responses were incorrect. Moreover, participants who were given the correct 
response immediately after providing an incorrect response performed significantly better 
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than other participants in retaining the correct responses up to one week later.  
According to Shanteau (1992), professionals (e.g., judges and attorneys) rarely 
receive feedback on task performance. However, it may be that their performance on 
certain tasks such as retaining/admitting psychology expert witnesses could be greatly 
improved if feedback was provided whenever a suboptimal expert witness decision was 
made. Judges may assert that feedback is not necessary given that, in theory, cross 
examination of expert witnesses is a procedural safeguard against inadequate expert 
witness decisions. On the contrary, the findings of the current study show that attorneys 
render equally flawed expert witness decisions; therefore, they do not appear to be in a 
position to adequately cross examine psychology experts. A thorough and effective cross 
examination requires knowledge of the area on which the expert has been called to 
testify. Current findings suggest that legal professionals lack a sufficient level of 
knowledge in psychology to adequately evaluate a psychology expert’s CV.  
Students, on the other hand, do not evaluate expert witness CVs on a regular basis 
and that is reflected in the lower levels of confidence they reported in their expert witness 
decisions compared to legal professionals. Moreover, undergraduate psychology students 
may not feel completely confident when evaluating the credentials of someone who has a 
higher level of education than they do. The current study required that participants 
evaluate the CV of someone who had earned a doctorate whereas the student participants 
in this study have not yet earned a bachelor’s degree. 
Decision Making Theories  
Although theoretical models of decision making were not tested directly, the 
current study allowed for estimates of the influence of central versus peripheral cues on 
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expert witness decisions. In the current study, central/systematic cues to decision making 
consisted of area of expertise and publication record whereas a peripheral/heuristic cue 
was the expert's prior expert witness testimony experience. Results showed that legal 
professionals and students alike were influenced significantly by the peripheral cue of 
previous expert witness testimony experience such that both groups labeled Dr. Jones an 
expert when the CV showed previous expert witness experience. Both the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model 
(HSM; Chaiken, 1980) appear to support theoretically the findings of the current study.  
Both models posit that decision makers must possess the ability/knowledge and the 
motivation to process information using the central route (ELM)/systematic (HSM) 
processing to render decisions. It was expected that legal professionals would rely on the 
peripheral/heuristic cue of previous expert testimony experience to render their expert 
witness decisions due to their lack of training in the various areas of psychology. Results 
revealed that while legal professionals relied on the peripheral cue of previous expert 
witness experience, they also relied partially on the central cue of area of expertise. 
The lack of difference between the groups in rendering adequate expert witness 
decisions, coupled with the primary influence of a heuristic/peripheral cue (previous 
expert testimony experience) in choosing the expert, may suggest that neither group 
possessed the ability/knowledge to complete this task successfully. However, given that 
legal professionals’ “correct” decisions were significantly influenced by a central cue 
(area of expertise) when presented with the eyewitness memory expert’s CV, this 
suggests that they were capable of central/systematic processing under some 
circumstances. It is likely the case, however, that a lack of motivation to process the 
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information systematically is what underlies both groups’ use of a heuristic/peripheral 
cue in rendering decisions. Because participants may have a mental prototype of what an 
expert witness CV should look like, it may be that both students and legal professionals 
relied on heuristics in an unconscious effort to conserve cognitive resources while 
evaluating the information presented. Fiske and Taylor (1984) posit that individuals often 
rely on mental shortcuts such as heuristics to evaluate information and render decisions 
because they tend to be “cognitive misers.” Cognitive miserliness is not necessarily a 
function of laziness but rather of the efficient use of one’s cognitive resources. Operario 
and Fiske (1999) found that while the methods used by cognitive misers may be 
successfully efficient, a major drawback is that suboptimal decisions often result from the 
use of heuristics/stereotypes. The findings of the current study suggest that participants 
may have approached as cognitive misers the task of evaluating expert witness suitability 
such that they relied in part on a heuristic cue to expertise to render expert witness 
decisions.   
Participants’ self-ratings of ability/knowledge and motivation were high and legal 
professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students in these areas. These 
findings are in line with Kahneman and Klein’s (2009) theory of fractionated expertise. 
The researchers posit that an important problem of fractionated expertise is that it may 
lead to overconfidence in decision-making on issues for which professionals have little or 
no skill. Legal professionals’ lack of skill in rendering sound psychology expert witness 
decisions, and high self-ratings of their ability and knowledge to do so suggests that they 
may possess fractionated expertise. That is, judges and attorneys may have attained a 
high level of skill in the theory and practice of law yet have not mastered all of the 
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necessary skills required for their work, such as distinguishing between types of 
psychology experts.  
Limitations, Policy Implications, and Future Directions 
 There are some limitations to the current study that should be considered when 
interpreting the results. Although the legal professionals who participated in the study 
represented a “real world” sample, the stimulus case and CV presentations were mere 
simulations. Specifically, the decisions made by participants in the study lacked the 
consequentiality of the high stakes decisions that judges and attorneys make in their 
everyday professional lives. Moreover, the study was administered online such that the 
case scenario and areas of expert witness testimony were presented in written form via 
personal computer. Actual trials typically occur in a courtroom with live testimony. 
Therefore, there was only limited control over how stimulus material was processed. The 
lack of ecological validity may have affected participants’ level of attention and 
motivation. That is, participants may not have attended to and processed the material as 
deeply as they may have in an actual courtroom in which they play a role in the outcome 
of the case.  
It appears that judges and attorneys have the ability to process systematically the 
information on an expert’s CV but may lack the skill/training to process the information 
accurately. Therefore, future research should focus on improving judges’ and attorneys’ 
psychology expert witness decision making. For example, it may be that simply 
introducing a brief summary of areas of psychology expertise along with the case and CV 
could enhance legal professionals’ ability to identify whether someone possesses the 
requisite training, education, and practice in the area of testimony required. It may also be 
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useful to develop a training module in which legal professionals are able to “practice” 
matching psychology experts to various cases by area of expertise. By offering training 
on the various areas of psychology expertise, then allowing legal professionals to apply 
what they have learned to practice cases followed by critical, immediate, and consistent 
feedback on their performance, legal professionals’ skill in this area may improve 
significantly. The overall low rate of successfully matching the expert’s area of expertise 
to the needs of the case suggests that legal professionals’ expert witness decision making 
may be enhanced through additional training and/or performance feedback. Training on 
the various areas of psychology expertise and providing feedback to attorneys and judges 
on their expert witness decisions is likely to enhance expert witness decision making 
ability thus improve attorneys’ ability to cross examination/challenge a proffered expert’s 
qualifications.   
Given judges’ responsibility as “gatekeepers” in the courtroom, it is critically 
important that they be highly skilled in distinguishing “good” from “bad” expertise. 
According to Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, the essence of Daubert and Kumho 
is to exclude “expertise that fausse and science that is junky” (Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 
1997). Justice Scalia also pointed out that while judges have the discretion to choose the 
manner in which they determine expert witness reliability, judges do not have the 
discretion to perform their gatekeeper function inadequately (Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 
1997). However, in order for judges to perform their gatekeeper function adequately, they 
must be provided with sufficient resources such as training on how to infer the reliability 
of expert testimony through an accurate evaluation of the proffered expert's 
qualifications/credentials. The United States Supreme Court has effectively determined 
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that it is a judge’s responsibility to evaluate appropriately the credentials of individuals 
whose education and training differs vastly from his/her own. However, this ruling does 
not take into account the level of expertise required to sift through various advanced 
degree specializations. Conversely, it would be equally difficult for a psychologist who 
has not attended law school to evaluate the credentials of judges and attorneys. Therefore, 
it may be advisable that judges consult with an objective third-party subject matter expert 
who can advise them in this regard.  
Faigman and Monahan (2009) asserted that courts face an incredible challenge in 
matching a psychology expert’s qualifications to the substantive nature of his/her 
testimony due to the sheer variety of psychology specialties. The faulty expert witness 
decision making of the psychology students in this study suggests that even those who 
receive some training in psychology struggle to distinguish between psychology experts. 
Therefore, an important future research direction should also examine under which 
conditions actual psychologists can distinguish between areas of psychology expertise. It 
may be that graduate training in psychology should include educating students on 
precisely what their area of expertise is and perhaps more importantly, what it is not. That 
type of training may be the most effective means of promoting accurate self-selection of 
future experts thus preventing pseudo psychology expertise from entering the courtroom.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Stimulus Case – Legal Psychology Expert 
State v. Smith 
Factual Background. At 2:30 am on August 5, 2009, a man was shot and killed. 
He was 19 years old. Just prior to his death, he was walking down the street with a friend 
when the perpetrator approached him from behind and shot him in the back of the head 
killing him. Two eyewitnesses were crossing the street at the same time as the alleged 
killer and were able to provide the police with a description of the man.  
 
The witnesses described the shooter as a black man, approximately six feet tall, 
with a thick nose and corn row braids, wearing a black, three quarter length pea coat style 
leather jacket, a red shirt, dark jeans and black Timberland boots. The witnesses observed 
the shooter walking with two other men, under streetlights, with a gun in his hand. They 
saw the shooter approach the victim and either saw or heard him shoot the victim and 
then flee. According to the victim’s family, they knew the defendant from the 
neighborhood and they gave the police the defendant’s name.  
 
Ten days after the incident, the police assembled a photographic lineup using a six 
photo array. Separate lineup procedures were conducted with each of the eyewitnesses. 
The witnesses were told that the perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup (thus the 
witnesses recognized that one of their options was to simply state that the person that 
they had seen was not present in the lineup). Each of the eyewitnesses picked the 
defendant's photograph out of the lineup. The defendant was arrested, admitted to having 
braids at the time of the incident, and admitted to being in the vicinity of the shooting at 
the time of the shooting while wearing a black leather jacket, a red shirt, black sweat 
pants, and black Timberland boots. The defendant was indicted on a variety of charges, 
including Murder in the Second Degree.  
 
In the weeks before the incident, the defendant had been working the overnight 
shift but he was not at work at the time of the murder. According to the defendant’s 
girlfriend, the defendant told her that although he matched the physical description of the 
suspect, he did not kill the victim. Therefore, the defendant made a motion to be 
permitted to present testimony at trial of an expert in eyewitness identification. The 
defendant advised that such expert would testify in various areas:  (1) the effect of 
weapon focus on identification; (2) unconscious transference; (3) lack of correlation 
between confidence and accuracy in eyewitness identification; (4) the effect of post event 
information on identification; and (5) confidence malleability. After hearing argument 
from the parties, the Court will allow testimony on the proffered five areas of testimony.  
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Expert Witness Testimony  
 
Dr. Jones will provide expert witness testimony on the scientific research below: 
 
• The Weapon Focus Effect. Weapon Focus refers to the focus or attention that an 
eyewitness gives to a perpetrator's weapon during the course of a crime at the 
expense of other to-be-remembered items or people. Weapon focus is a factor 
affecting the reliability of eyewitness testimony and signifies a witness to a crime 
diverting his or her attention to the weapon the perpetrator is holding, thus leaving 
less attention for other details in the scene and leading to memory impairments 
later for those other details.  
 
• Post Event Information (PEI) Effect. The PEI effect refers to the notion that 
eyewitnesses’ recollection of an event is influenced by information, sometimes 
incorrect, obtained after the event. Post-event information can be disseminated 
inadvertently by co-witnesses and police through the use of leading, suggestive 
questions and successive retellings of the sequence of events.  
 
 
• Unconscious Transference. Unconscious transference refers to the notion that 
people can misidentify and get confused about the context in which they have 
seen people and mistakenly associate them with the wrong situation or context. 
Specifically, this refers to an eyewitness's misidentification of an innocent 
bystander because of the witness’s exposure to the bystander in another context. 
This can happen either before, after, or during an event.  
 
  
• Confidence and Accuracy non-Correlation. This refers to the lack of a strong 
overall relationship between the accuracy of an eyewitness identification and the 
confidence the witness expresses in such identification. Findings detailed in 
various studies have shown that there is a lack of correlation between eyewitness 
confidence and the accuracy of their identifications.  
 
• Confidence Malleability.  This refers to the notion that an eyewitness's confidence 
can be influenced by factors that are unrelated to identification accuracy such as 
confirming feedback from the police officers (i.e., “Good job! You picked out the 
right guy!”) and biased lineup instructions (i.e., failing to inform the eyewitness 
that the perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup). 
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Stimulus Case – Clinical Psychology Expert 
State v. Smith 
Factual Background. At 2:30 am on August 5, 2009, a man was stabbed and 
killed. He was 19 years old. Just prior to his death, he was walking down the street with a 
friend when the perpetrator approached him from behind and stabbed him in his upper 
back killing him. Two eyewitnesses were crossing the street at the same time as the 
alleged killer and were able to provide the police with a description of the man.  
 
The witnesses described the culprit as a black man, approximately six feet tall, 
with a thick nose and corn row braids, wearing a black, three quarter length pea coat style 
leather jacket, a red shirt, dark jeans and black Timberland boots. The witnesses observed 
the suspect walking with two other men, under streetlights, with a knife in his hand. They 
saw the suspect approach the victim, stab the victim, and then flee. According to the 
victim’s family, they knew the defendant from the neighborhood and they gave the police 
the defendant’s name.  
 
Ten days after the incident, the police assembled a photographic lineup using a six 
photo array. Separate lineup procedures were conducted with each of the eyewitnesses. 
The witnesses were told that the perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup (thus the 
witnesses recognized that one of their options was to simply state that the person that 
they had seen was not present in the lineup). Each of the eyewitnesses picked the 
defendant's photograph out of the lineup. The defendant was arrested, admitted to having 
braids at the time of the incident, and admitted to being in the vicinity of the stabbing at 
the time of the murder while wearing a black leather jacket, a red shirt, black sweat pants, 
and black Timberland boots. The defendant was indicted on a variety of charges, 
including Murder in the Second Degree.  
 
In the weeks before the incident, the defendant had been admitted to a psychiatric 
hospital, stating that he felt detached from reality and “was not in his right mind” but he 
had been released from the hospital at the time of the murder. According to the 
defendant’s girlfriend, the defendant had a history of violent behavior, was a heavy 
drinker, used drugs recreationally and always felt that others were ‘out to get him’.  Her 
boyfriend told her that he had been drinking the night of the alleged murder, remembered 
seeing the victim and was not in control of his actions the night of the alleged murder.  
However, he does not believe that he killed the victim. Therefore, the defendant made a 
motion to be permitted to present testimony at trial of an expert in mental health. The 
defendant advised that such expert would testify in various areas: (1) the relationship 
between violent and homicidal behavior (2) the characteristics of psychotic episodes (3) 
the characteristics and behavioral components of paranoid schizophrenia; (4) the effects 
of severe alcoholism and drug use on paranoid schizophrenia symptoms; and, (5) 
psychological factors that lead to diminished capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness and 
consequences of one’s actions. After hearing argument from the parties, the Court will 
allow expert witness testimony in the proffered five areas of expertise. 
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Expert Witness Testimony  
  
Dr. Jones will provide expert witness testimony on the scientific research below: 
• The Behavioral Correlates of Psychotic Episodes. Psychosis refers to a loss of 
contact with reality, usually including false beliefs about what is taking place or 
who one is (delusions) and seeing or hearing things that are not there 
(hallucinations). Psychosis may be caused by certain medical conditions such as 
alcohol and drug abuse, and brain diseases such as tumors, HIV and other 
infections, and dementia. It can also be caused by psychiatric disorders such as 
bipolar disorder, depression with psychotic features, and/or schizophrenia.  
 
• Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Effects on Mentally Ill Individuals. Alcoholism 
refers to signs of physical addiction to alcohol and that an individual continues to 
drink, despite problems with physical health, mental health, and social, family, or 
job responsibilities. Drug addiction refers to the compulsive use of a substance, 
despite its negative or dangerous effects. Individuals who suffer from certain 
psychiatric disorders, such as bipolar disorder or schizophrenia, are more likely 
than others to suffer from alcohol and drug addictions.  
 
• Paranoid schizophrenia refers to one of several types of schizophrenia, a chronic 
mental illness in which a person loses touch with reality (psychosis). The classic 
features of paranoid schizophrenia are having delusions and hearing things that 
are not real.  With paranoid schizophrenia, the ability to think and function in 
daily life may be better than with other types of schizophrenia. Paranoid 
schizophrenia is a serious, lifelong condition that can lead to many complications, 
including violent behavior.  
 
• The Relationship between Violent and Homicidal Behavior. This refers to the 
research on structural brain abnormalities and dysfunction and the relationship 
between brain abnormalities and violent, aggressive, and homicidal behavior in 
particular.  
 
• Psychological Factors that Lead to Diminished Capacity. Diminished capacity 
refers to the inability to appreciate the consequences of one’s actions and/or the 
ability to act in a premeditated manner due to mental defect/disease. 
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APPENDIX C 
Post hoc Questionnaire 
1. In your opinion, is Dr. Jones an expert in the areas of proffered testimony? 
a. Yes (Dr. Jones IS an expert in these areas)  
b. No (Dr. Jones IS NOT an expert in these areas)  
 
2.  How confident are you in this decision? 
    0%     10%    20%    30%    40%    50%     60%     70%   80%   90%   100% 
not at all        completely 
confident                                                                                                  confident 
 
 
3. How likely are you to appoint (hire/choose) Dr. Jones to testify as an expert in the 
areas of proffered testimony? 
a. Not at all likely (1) 
b. Unlikely (2) 
c. Somewhat Unlikely (3) 
d. Neither Likely nor Unlikely (4) 
e. Somewhat Likely (5) 
f. Likely (6) 
g. Entirely likely (7) 
 
4. Dr. Jones is competent in the field of expertise that s/he purports to address at 
trial. 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
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5. Dr. Jones possesses the skills necessary to assume that the information imparted 
or the opinion rendered is reliable. 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
 
6. Dr. Jones possesses the required training to assume that the information imparted 
or the opinion rendered  is reliable 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
 
7. Dr. Jones possesses the required education to assume that the information 
imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
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8. Dr. Jones possesses the required knowledge to assume that the information 
imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
 
9. Dr. Jones possesses the required experience to assume that the information 
imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable. 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
 
10. Dr. Jones’ testimony is likely to be based on a scientific principle which has been 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs. 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7)  
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11. Dr. Jones’ testimony is likely to be based on a scientific procedure which has 
been sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs. 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
 
12. Dr. Jones’ testimony is beyond the knowledge or perception of the jury. 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
 
13. Dr. Jones’ opinion is relevant to the issues and facts of the individual case. 
 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
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14. How important were Dr. Jones’ academic credentials in your decision-making 
process? 
a. Not at all Important (1) 
b. Very Unimportant (2) 
c. Somewhat Unimportant (3) 
d. Neither Important nor Unimportant (4) 
e. Somewhat Important (5) 
f. Very Important (6) 
g. Extremely Important (7) 
 
15. How important was Dr. Jones’ specific area of academic training in your 
decision-making process? 
a. Not at all Important (1) 
b. Very Unimportant (2) 
c. Somewhat Unimportant (3) 
d. Neither Important nor Unimportant (4) 
e. Somewhat Important (5) 
f. Very Important (6) 
g. Extremely Important (7) 
 
 
16. How important were Dr. Jones’ professional credentials in your decision-making 
process? 
a. Not at all Important (1) 
b. Very Unimportant (2) 
c. Somewhat Unimportant (3) 
d. Neither Important nor Unimportant (4) 
e. Somewhat Important (5) 
f. Very Important (6) 
g. Extremely Important (7) 
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17. How important was Dr. Jones’ previous experience as an expert witness in your 
decision-making process? 
a. Not at all Important (1) 
b. Very Unimportant (2) 
c. Somewhat Unimportant (3) 
d. Neither Important nor Unimportant (4) 
e. Somewhat Important (5) 
f. Very Important (6) 
g. Extremely Important (7) 
 
18. How important was Dr. Jones’ specific area of expertise as an expert witness in 
your decision-making process? 
a. Not at all Important (1) 
b. Very Unimportant (2) 
c. Somewhat Unimportant (3) 
d. Neither Important nor Unimportant (4) 
e. Somewhat Important (5) 
f. Very Important (6) 
g. Extremely Important (7) 
 
19. I have the ability to identify an appropriate expert witness. 
 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
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20. I have the knowledge to identify an appropriate expert witness. 
 
a. Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
 
21. I am motivated to identify an appropriate expert witness.  
 
a.  Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
 
22. Dr. Jones’ curriculum vita (CV) is representative of what an expert witness’s CV 
should look like. 
 
a.  Strongly Disagree (1) 
b. Disagree (2) 
c. Somewhat Disagree (3) 
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
e. Somewhat Agree (5) 
f. Agree (6) 
g. Strongly Agree (7) 
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APPENDIX D 
Demographics Questionnaires 
Judges’ Demographics 
 
1. Please tell us your gender. 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 
2.  Please tell us your age. 
 
3.  Please tell us the number of years that you have been a judge overall. 
 
4.  Please tell us the number of years that you have been a judge. 
 
5. Please tell us the number of years that you practiced law before becoming a judge. 
 
6. Please tell us whether you have ever received any training in psychology. If you have, 
please tell us when you were trained and the length of the training. 
 
7. Which of the following categories best reflects your ethnic/racial identity? (check only 
one) 
 
_____  African American   _____ Asian/Pacific Island 
 
_____ Caucasian: Non-Hispanic  _____ Hispanic 
 
_____ Native American   _____ Other __________________ 
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Attorneys’ Demographics 
1. Please tell us your gender. 
 Male  
 Female  
 
2.  Please tell us your age. 
 
3.  Please tell us the number of years that you have been an attorney overall. 
 
4.  Please tell us the number of years that you have been a criminal trial attorney. 
 
5. Please tell us your area of practice.  
 Defense attorney 
 Prosecutor 
6. Please tell us whether you have ever received any training in psychology. If you have, 
please tell us when you were trained and the length of the training. 
 
7. Which of the following categories best reflects your ethnic/racial identity? (check only 
one) 
 
_____  African American   _____ Asian/Pacific Island 
 
_____ Caucasian: Non-Hispanic  _____ Hispanic 
 
_____ Native American   _____ Other __________________ 
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Students’ Demographics 
 
1. Please tell us your gender. 
 Male  
 Female  
2.  Please tell us your age. 
3.  Which of the following categories best reflects your ethnic/racial identity? (check only 
one) 
 
_____  African American   _____ Asian/Pacific Island 
 
_____ Caucasian: Non-Hispanic  _____ Hispanic 
 
_____ Native American   _____ Other __________________ 
 
4. What is the highest education level you have completed? 
 
_____  High School graduate   _____ Junior year in college 
 
_____ Freshman year in college  _____ Senior year in college 
 
_____ Sophomore year in college   
 
5. What is your current work status?  Check one: 
_____ Employed full time _____ Employed part time  _____ Unemployed 
 
What is your occupation? ____________________________________________  
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